




Rappaport.	Leiden:	Brill,	2015,	203	pp.,	ISBN	978-90-04-29365-6	(hdbk)	$109.00	€84.00			 This	book,	as	its	author	recounts	in	the	preface,	began	as	a	“vague	idea”	(p.	vii)	of	his	about	religion.	It	is	the	condensed	version	(after	“hard	work”,	p.	vii)	of	a	doctoral	dissertation.	The	basic	idea	of	the	book	is	that	religion	can	be	explained	as	an	emergent	phenomenon	(in	that	respect,	the	book	is	entirely	unoriginal).	In	the	book	–	after	a	“primer”	on	emergence	and	semiotics,	based	largely	on	work	from	Terrence	Deacon	–	two	canonical	authors	in	religious	studies,	sociologist	Émile	Durkheim	(1858–1919)	and	anthropologist	Roy	Rappaport	(1926–1997),	are	reinterpreted	in	the	light	of	recent	emergence	theories.	Before	I	assess	what	the	reader	in	the	end	gains	from	this	critical	exegesis	and	update,	let	me	outline	the	overarching	approach	towards	religion.		 The	aim	of	emergence	theories	of	religion	is	to	“provide	natural	explanations	for	what	has	traditionally	begged	for	supernatural	explanation”	(p.	3).	Religions	can	be	seen	as	an	examples	of	“systems	whose	organizational	dynamics	use	signs	to	maintain	themselves	and	navigate	their	environment,	without	the	need	for	divine	help”	(p.	3).	The	divine,	instead,	represents	an	emergent	quality	of	these	systems.	Authors	such	as	Durkheim	and	Rappaport	have	already	offered	emergence	theories	of	religion,	but	Cassell	sees	value	in	updating	their	accounts	based	on	the	latest	writings	on	emergence	theories	(mostly	focused	on	biology).		 According	to	Cassell,	good	theories	of	religion	must	explain	“why	the	experiences	resulting	from	religious	participation	can	be	such	a	powerful	source	of	personal	transformation”	(p.	10)	and	why	they	give	the	impression	of	transcendence.	Ritual	and	myth	must	play	central	roles	in	such	theories.	Durkheim	and	Rappaport	do	not	yet	offer	good	theories	of	religion.	Cassell	points	out	that	Durkheim	“is	not	able	to	theoretically	distinguish	politics	from	religion”	(p.	12)	and	that	Rappaport	“does	not	adequately	explain	how	ritual	and	myth	.	.	.	create	meaningful	religious	experience”	(p.	12).			 After	his	first	introductory	chapter,	six	chapters	follow,	distributed	over	two	parts	(on	the	emergent	dynamics	of	religion	and	the	emergence	of	meaning	in	religion,	respectively).	Chapter	2	introduces	and	revisits	Rappaport,	Chapter	3	gives	the	primer	into	emergence	and	semiotics,	and	Chapter	4	describes	religion’s	emergent	characteristics.	The	latter	two	chapters	are	quite	difficult	to	plough	through	as	a	reader	not	well	steaped	in	the	theories	that	Cassell	describes.	They	describe	religion	as	an	emergent	social	phenomenon,	“where	mythic	beliefs	about	the	divine	(a	form	of	culturally-passed	down	memory)	are	taken	up	in	ritual	(a	
cultural	practice)	to	link	synergistically	the	psychological	experiences	of	individuals	and	the	dynamics	of	group	organization”	(p.	107).	Part	2,	“focus[ing]	more	on	the	question	of	religion’s	meaningfulness,	following	Durkheim’s	approach”	(p.	107),	is	more	accessible	and	starts	in	Chapter	5	with	an	interesting	rendering	of	the	arguments	of	evolutionary	biologist	David	Sloan	Wilson	and	philosopher	Daniel	Dennett	that	religion	has	no	meaning.	Cassell	claims	that	both	authors	have	ignored	any	emergent	experiences,	values,	or	meaning	associated	with	religion.	In	Chapter	6,	he	then	adds	Durkheim’s	“account	of	the	emergent	qualities	of	religious	community	participation”	to	the	mix,	in	order	to	be	able	to	conclude	in	Chapter	7	with	“a	fuller	account	of	these	emergent	qualities”	(p.	107).	 The	last	chapter	of	the	book,	titled	“Varieties	of	Religious	Meaning”,	is	the	most	interesting	one,	even	though	it	is	not	clearly	structured.	The	general	gist	of	his	illustrations	of	the	way	in	which	religions	have	meaning	is	that	from	positing	the	divine	as	true	in	religious	ritual	something	valuable	is	leveraged	to	individuals.	Cassell	discusses	how	religion	can	offer	therapeutic	truth	(healing	physically	and	psychologically;	resolving	unresolvables	via	hope;	creating	better	selves;	evoking	novel	blends	of	emotions)	and	social	orientation.	I	doubt,	however,	that	the	reader	in	the	end	has	gained	much	insight	from	Cassell’s	exercise.	Philosophically,	the	book	is	not	very	systematic	and	the	author	tries	to	compare	and	combine	too	many	theories	with	too	many	other	theories.	That	being	said,	there	are	a	couple	of	really	deep	insights	contained	in	the	book	and	readers	who	are	well-versed	in	Terrence	Deacon’s	works	may	find	it	of	use.	
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